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Abstract 
Risk and uncertainty will always be a matter of experience, luck, skills, and modelling. 
Leverage is another concept, which is critical for the investor’s decisions and results. Adaptive 
skills and quantitative probabilistic methods need to be used in successful management of risk, 
uncertainty and leverage. The author explores how uncertainty beyond risk determines 
consistent leverage in a simple model of the world with fat tails due to significant, not fully 
quantifiable and not too rare events. Among particular technical results, for the single asset 
fractional Kelly criterion is derived in the presence of the fat tails associated with subjective 
uncertainty. For the multi-asset portfolio, Kelly criterion provides an insightful perspective on 
Risk Parity strategies, which can be extended for the assets with fat tails. 
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Uncertainty and risk play fundamental role in the portfolio and risk management. The more 
objective measurable and the more subjective non-quantitative aspects of decisions can be 
separated into risk and uncertainty correspondingly (Knight 1964). The risk, with known and 
quantifiable probabilities and outcomes, became associated with the standard deviation (or 
volatility) within classical expected utility theory and Black-Scholes-Merton theory. Not 
surprisingly, the uncertainty is associated with other less understood, yet important, concepts 
of unquantifiable outcomes, liquidity, partial information and subjective behavioural biases  
(Booth 2014). Uncertainty and risk constrain the leverage (allocation size), which would 
amplify the premium returns in unlimited way. While Kelly criterion (Kelly 1956) proposed 
optimal leverage in the presence of risk, the fascinating conceptual link between leverage and 
uncertainty is explored quantitatively and phenomenologically here. 
General consequences of Kelly criterion in the world with fat tails are discussed with the 
practical angle of the portfolio and risk management practitioner. In the view of the 
complexity of modelling the processes and phenomena with fat (heavy or power-law) tails, 
only a simple probabilistic model is analysed quantitatively here. The paper is organised as 
follows. The introductory section “Risk and Uncertainty” sets the stage and discusses different 
aspects of risk and uncertainty. The section “Risk and Leverage” reviews the conceptual links 
between risk and leverage in the modern finance and introduces the Kelly criterion. The two 
sections “Kelly criterion in the fat tails world” and “Kelly Parity” are more technical and 
mathematical; these sections contain several novel quantitative results about Kelly criterion for 
a single asset and for multi-asset portfolio calculated in a simple toy probabilistic model of the 
world with fat tails. How the uncertainty, parametrised by left and right tails of the probability 
distribution, changes the Kelly criterion is presented in the section “Kelly criterion in the fat 
tails world”. Basic important connections are established between Kelly Parity, based on Kelly 
criterion, Risk Parity, a popular risk control portfolio approach, and classic Mean-Variance 
Optimization in the section “Kelly Parity”. The effects of the volatility skew and convexity2 on 
Kelly Parity and Risk Parity are also discussed. The “Adaptive management of risk, 
uncertainty, and leverage” section considers practical application of statistical Kelly system in 
dynamic and intermittent real-world financial markets. The “Conclusion” section consolidates 
the general insights and presents the outlook. Simple conceptual consequences of the 
drawdown aversion, related to the uncertainty of the significant losses, on the efficient frontier 
in the classic portfolio theory are explored in the appendix “Concave Efficient Frontier”. 
Another appendix contains the details of Kelly criterion calculations in the simple probabilistic 
model with a tail loss. 
Risk and Uncertainty 
The key concepts of risk and uncertainty have been explored from different perspectives and 
play different roles in any real life decision making. The risk is about quantifiable probabilities 
and outcomes; the uncertainty is about degree of belief and subjectivity. From one side, 
classical and neo-classical theoretical economics made tremendous progress by focusing on 
risk in the framework of the probabilistic decision theory and the utility theory. Black-Scholes-
Merton theory (Black 1973) and Mean-Variance optimisation theory (Markowitz 1959) have 
been developed in the rigorous mathematical formulation where the volatility represents the 
risk. From another side, the practical finance and risk-management practices proceeded by 
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realising the duality3 between risk and uncertainty and defining the VaR boundary separating 
them (Brown 2012). The inefficiency of the markets (Shiller 2005) and the behavioural biases 
and aversions (Kahneman 1979) have been also recognized in driving the uncertainty of the 
markets. Markets are uncertain as much as risky. 
The uncertainty has many subjective and non-quantifiable, in the sense of Keynes and Knight, 
aspects. The uncertainty can be associated with fat tails of the probability distributions. 
Although this is certainly an oversimplification, I will make the following proposition; the risk 
and the uncertainty can be associated with the centre and the fat tails of the probability density 
functions (pdf’s) correspondingly. In this paper, I use this simple proposition, which allows 
advancing the understanding of the uncertainty. Formally, under a unit measure, (the total 
probability is one), the tails is what remains after the possible risks are quantified. In each 
present moment, the price is clearly certain within bid and offer prices for any, unless very 
illiquid, asset. The markets are more certain about the centre of the distribution, while the 
investors differ in their subjective views more strongly about the tail outcomes4. To expand on 
the above proposition, subjective probability distribution functions can be thought to be 
incorporating all those subjective factors (limited information, behavioural biases, liquidity 
information, limited capital, etc.) into the tails of the distribution functions of the individual 
investors. Yet the centre of the distributions is quite constrained for all investors by the current 
market valuations and “current markets consensus”. Subjective view on the risk can definitely 
be different from the collective market view, but collective markets efficiency imposes strong 
constraints at not too long time horizons. At longer time horizons and larger deviations5, the 
uncertainty becomes more important, and notwithstanding the markets efficiency, the markets 
are much more time dependent and inconsistent than the current pricing (of the forward curves 
and the options at different maturities) suggests. Essentially, by their construction and their 
actions, the markets explore and “quantify” the central “phase space”6 of possible risks7, and 
the remote parts of the phase space represent the uncertainty. These remote parts of the pdf, 
which have lower probability and longer time8 to be reached, are naturally assigned to the tails.  
Several other aspects of the uncertainty are notable. Firstly, the subjective difference between 
the price and the value is another definition of the uncertainty. At the height of panic or 
irrational exuberance, the uncertainty as well as the mispricing are at the highest. Risk 
perception may differ from risk reality, and the uncertainty is in the eye of the beholder. 
Secondly, the uncertainty has a systemic component, due to the collective financial system, 
and the idiosyncratic components due to unpredictable events (political, social, technological, 
etc.). Thirdly, although many possible unpredictable events and their unstable sequences may 
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occur, all these uncertainties need to be codified and lumped together into the fat tails. In other 
words, the markets are clearly incomplete in the tails. 
In reality, risk and uncertainty mix and not clearly delineated, while they might only be 
separated in a graphical representation of pdf (probability density function) or any kind of a 
model. The modelling of uncertainty is paradoxical, and the models are only metaphors, which 
should not be taken too seriously (Derman 2012). After all, markets would not be needed if a 
perfect (deterministic or stochastic) model existed, and the markets is efficient mechanism, 
which is as of now “the worst, except for all others”.  The related phenomena of subjectivity, 
diversity and uncertainty appear to be essential and intrinsic for the competitive markets. 
Several general points illustrate further the dichotomy and complementarity of risk and 
uncertainty. Firstly, the diversification, one of the pillars of modern finance theory, is proposed 
to reduce the ‘risks’9, yet the financial ‘risks’ do not disappear, but they transform into different 
shapes and forms. To put it differently, the diversification rebalances the ‘risks’ between the 
“familiar risk” around the centre of the distribution (the volatility) and the “uncertain risk” 
of the tails of the distribution (the uncertainty). Secondly, a single realization of the future 
possibilities carries enormous importance for the investors behaviourally, sociologically 
(Nelson 2014) and organizationally (in the sense of agent-agency problem). The history is a 
single path, not “Monte-Carlo averaged”10.  The finite sample of important investor’s decisions 
is ever present in mixing risk and uncertainty11, although the expected utility theory does not 
distinguish between a single and multiple bets decisions (Samuelson 1963). Thirdly, in the 
absence of the model12, the centre and the tails cannot be separated unambiguously, since the 
volatility of the markets is time-dependent. For example, “Bayesian adjustment” in GARCH 
models corrects what would be a naïve mixing of uncertainty and risk (Arnott 2005). 
The mathematical description of the various real-life risks and the uncertainty is hard and 
illusive, and in any case the high level of skill and experience is required in the application of 
the quantitative models successfully in the real financial markets. It seems fair to say that, 
although the empirical presence of fat tails in financial time series is widely accepted, there is 
no well-established and accepted dynamic theory in finance13, which describes realistically the 
fat tails. Major advances ( (Mandelbrot 1997), (Sornette 2004), (Engle 1995), (Mantegna 
2000)) have been made to describe fat-tailed distributions, but there are principal and 
conceptual differences between the markets and natural sciences. The limitations are non-
repeatability of history and the adaptability of the financial markets to name a few. Modelling 
of outlier events can be problematic, as a matter of principle, and the models have to be used 
sceptically. The quantitative models tend to be recalibrated on the new market data and lack 
the predictive power of the models in the natural sciences. Yet, even in the absence of 
scientifically sound dynamic models, the fat tails are the definitive manifestations of the 
transitive dynamic reality and behavioural tendencies of the markets, and these innate 
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properties must be considered in any portfolio management quantitatively and qualitatively, 
just like in the modern options pricing and management.  
The fat-tailed nature of the distributions in finance is all-important and inherent, rather than 
minor or secondary, property of the markets (Mandelbrot and Taleb 2010). “What risk really 
means” is the very important question, and I think that uncertainty and possibility of a loss 
associated with the downside fat tails is the most relevant threat. “What they fear is the 
possibility of permanent loss” (Marks 2015). Thus, the risk management of the uncertainty and 
fat tails is of critical importance. A recent model-free analysis of historical data showed that 
for majority of the trading strategies (with several specific exceptions) the risk premium is 
largely due to the presence of the skew or equivalently downside fat tail (Lemperiere 2015). 
This major empirical finding14 incentivises deeper research into the connections between the 
uncertainty (fat tails) and the leverage (capital allocation), which is the topic of this paper.  
Leverage and Risk 
The leverage - the allocation size - is as important as the odds (the probabilities) of the 
outcomes for the capital allocation decisions. The leverage needs to be decided in absolute 
terms with respect to the investor’s available capital and in relative terms with respect to 
relative allocation between different assets (or trading strategies) within the investor’s 
portfolio. In the modern portfolio theory (Markowitz 1959), the relative allocation between 
different assets, based on their expected returns, volatilities and correlations, is the focus of the 
theory. The leverage financing of the modern financial system permits an investor to choose 
the absolute leverage among other risk preferences. Leverage aversion changes the predictions 
of the portfolio theory (Assness 2012), and modern Risk Parity (RP) strategies exploit this 
opportunity. Leverage is a mechanism and a tool, not a danger in itself, while uncertainty and 
permanent loss can definitely be associated with danger. 
Absolute leverage is a risk decision determined by internal and external (due to the perception 
of the counterparties providing leverage financing) factors. Uncertainty, rather than risk, 
appears to be a more determining factor for the absolute leverage, since both, absolute leverage 
and uncertainty, are more collectively determined properties with individual variations. 
Qualitatively, uncertainty appears to be more important determinant of the absolute leverage, 
risk determines relative leverages. The collective effects of aggregate market liquidity and 
leverage have been elucidated (Adrian 2010) by pointing out the role of financial intermediaries 
and credit cycles. Liquidity and uncertainty are complex and different for different market 
participants. Market liquidity, funding liquidity (Brunnermeier 2008), absolute and relative 
leverage, and uncertainty are intimately linked by direct and indirect mechanisms, and are very 
much parts of the markets dynamics and challenges. Overall, the uncertainty and the liquidity 
shed light on each other15. Both concepts are hard to define fully even qualitatively, and both 
are complex and multi-dimensional16.  
After the above overview of general aspects of the leverage, I would like to introduce the 
mathematical Kelly criterion (Kelly 1956), which prescribes the optimal allocation of the 
current capital for the ‘best long run’. Suppose a favourable outcome wins b units for every 
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unit wager. Further, suppose that for each trial the win probability is p > 0, the lose probability 
is q, and the expectation of the game pb-q >0 is positive. From optimization of the geometric 
growth rate, the optimal fraction of the current capital is 𝑓∗ = (𝑏𝑝 − 𝑞)/𝑏. In the continuous 
limit of the random Gaussian process with the expected return  and the volatility  𝜎, Kelly 
allocation is a dimensionless fraction 17  of the available capital 𝑓∗ = 𝜇/𝜎2 . The optimal 
geometric growth rate is equal to 𝑔∗ =
1
2
𝜇𝑓∗. The quantitative and statistical power of Kelly 
system rests on accurate estimate of the risk parameters and multiple bets “averaging”. 
In the Gaussian (and binomial) model, in the absence of uncertainty (tails), the optimal leverage 
is fully determined by the risk (the volatility) in the optimization problem for a given return. 
For the binomial outcomes, the optimal allocation has several nice properties (Thorp 2006); (a) 
maximizing the geometric growth rate, (b) minimizing the probability of ruin, (c) the penalty 
in reduced growth rate for moderate underbetting, which offers a margin of safety, is not severe. 
The drawbacks of Kelly system are as follows: (a) the intermediate returns are volatile roller 
coasters (due to a constant proportion betting), (b) the drawdowns can be large, and (c) ruin is 
possible. The practical application has also several challenges (M. J. Mauboussin 2006): (a) 
the performance of money managers is frequently evaluated on arithmetic returns, not 
geometric returns essential in Kelly system, (b) possible large drawdowns and loss aversion 
can bias investors away from Kelly system. 
Kelly criterion in the fat tails world 
Kelly criterion is a major theoretical insight, which provides a practical guideline, but the 
application requires certainly adept skills and experience (Thorp 2006). In order to make 
mathematical progress to extend Kelly criterion to the world with the uncertainty, we will have 
to parametrise the tails of the pdf. Due to the theories of Savage and others, subjective 
probabilities can be reduced to mathematical probabilities, although not always fully 
consistently (Ellsberg 1961). The section “Adaptive management of risk, uncertainty, and 
leverage” will discuss the practical aspects of the application of the extended Kelly criterion, 
given the conceptual differences between uncertainty and quantifiable risk, in the real world. 
Our aim in this section is to develop Kelly criterion in risky and uncertain world18  in the 
presence of fat tails. The main quantity of the interest is the total wealth (capital) after many 
(N) rounds of the financial bets  𝑊 = ∏ (1 + 𝑓𝑖 𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ), where 𝑓𝑖 is the fraction of the capital 
invested in the round 𝑖, and the (negative or positive) outcome is 𝑋𝑖. The problem is to find the 
optimal fractions 𝑓𝑖 in order to maximize the final wealth and to minimize the unfavourable 
outcomes and risks. 
In the presence of the tail losses of the probability 𝛼 and the size 𝐸𝑇𝐿 and tail wins of the 
probability 𝛽 and the size 𝐸𝑇𝑊, the generalized results for the leverage  𝑓1
∗ and the growth 
rate 𝑔1
∗  of a single asset in a simple toy model are 
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which depends on the time scale. In other words, the risk is the variance, more appropriately than the volatility 
(where the risk factor is being proportional to the volatility in CAPM). See also (Arnott 2005). 
18 ‘Risky world’ means the world with the risk (the volatility), while ‘risky and uncertain world’ means the world 
of the volatility and fat tails. These worlds can be also called “Mediocristan” and “Extremistan” (Thorp, 
Mizusawa 2013). 
𝑓1
∗ ≈
𝜇
𝜎2
1 +
𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝑊 − 𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇 (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)
1 +
𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝑊2 + 𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿2
𝜎2(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)
 
𝑔1
∗ ≈ 0.5(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)
𝜇2
𝜎2
(1 +
𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝑊 − 𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇 (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)
)
2
1 +
𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝑊2 + 𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿2
𝜎2(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)
 
The constant fraction betting is assumed, and the calculations are given in Appendix A. In the 
case of  𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝑊 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿, the volatility convexity, which results in the symmetric fat tails, 
decreases the growth factor in two ways. First way is the multiplier  (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽), which is a 
mere consequence of the probability weights taken away from the centre to the tails. Second 
way is the multiplier 1 (1 +
𝛽∙𝐸𝑇𝑊2+𝛼∙𝐸𝑇𝐿2
𝜎2(1−𝛼−𝛽)
⁄ ), due to larger variance associated with the tails. 
The remaining effect additional to the convexity effect is the skew effect (the volatility skew) 
on the growth factor due to the multiplier   (1 +
𝛽∙𝐸𝑇𝑊−𝛼∙𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇 (1−𝛼−𝛽)
)
2
. For the simplicity, in the 
absence of the right tail the skew effect of the fatter loss tail shows up as a correction  (1 −
2𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇(1−𝛼)
) in the leading order of the 𝐸𝑇𝐿 parameter. Thus, the convexity and the downside (𝐸𝑇𝐿 
related) skew reduce simple Kelly fraction   𝑓0
∗ and the growth rate  𝑔0
∗. These results19 provide 
a more detailed understanding why fractional Kelly ratio  𝑓1
∗  must be used in practice (Thorp 
2006). The important difference from Kelly criterion in risky world is that the tail parameters 
𝛼, 𝐸𝑇𝐿, 𝛽, 𝐸𝑇𝑊 are subjective, and therefore the expectations about the growth rate 𝑔1
∗ can 
differ widely among different investors. 
 
The uncertainty means that no model can express the parameters of the tails accurately; 
nevertheless, the above results show that there are several qualitative fractional effects due to 
the weight shift 𝛼 to the tails and due to the tail loss  𝐸𝑇𝐿. All effects are significant (of order 
of fraction of unity), while the tail impact parameter 
2𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇(1−𝛼)
 can easily make the growth rate 
negative and therefore uncertain for the realistic parameters20. The chosen pdf function is a toy 
model, which nevertheless gives important qualitative insights, while the realistic power-law 
pdf would have to be investigated numerically. Although an asset may or may not have a 
sufficiently skewed right tail for high positive capital growth, the non-linear payoffs of the 
derivatives can have a right-tail skew. (Thorp, Mizusawa 2013) investigated in detail the capital 
growth of the vanilla call options aiming to maximize the geometric returns with limited 
drawdowns21. In the world of fat tails (“Extremistan”), they found that options portfolio attains 
better regions of the geometric growth frontier than the underlying asset and have still better 
profile of the drawdowns.  
                                                          
19 It is also clear that the leverage and growth rate can have so called convexity adjustments due the volatility 
of the volatility. 
20 For instance, 𝛼 = 20%, 𝐸𝑇𝐿 = 30% and  𝜇 = 6%. 
21 The wealth is a random multiplicative process, which is dominated by the most probable value in the finite 
sample rather than its “true average value” (Redner 1990). The crossover to the asymptotic “true average” 
growth of the product of N independent random numbers in the sampling is exponentially slow in N, and the 
impact of tail loss on the crossover and on the dominance of Kelly strategy are challenging issues.  The path-
dependent results should surely depend on the loss size ETL, and this is why the management of the 
drawdowns (limiting the losses) is critical. 
The intuitive and tutorial understanding of the power of the geometric growth and the pitfalls 
of the additional extreme outcomes is illustrated by a simple numerical example22. A run of 
100 even bets (1 and -1 outcomes) with 60 winning bets and 40 losing bets is offered. Kelly 
prescribes betting each time 20% of the current capital, which is the winning edge difference 
between winning and losing. After 100 bankrolls, the optimal betting will give the “average 
geometric return” of 749%. For a realistic sequence of only 100 bets, several “extreme sub-
sequences” will dominate; see below for the discussion of the statistics of the multiplicative 
processes. Now suppose large losses or wins can happen. We can calculate the growth rate in 
three more cases; Tail Loss (TL) for one bet out of 100 of losing three times your bet, Tail Win 
(TW) for one bet out of 100 of winning three times your bet, Both Tails (BT) for one bet each 
of winning and losing 3 times your bet. The growth rates are correspondingly𝑔𝑇𝐿 = 366%, 
𝑔𝑇𝑊 = 1246% and 𝑔𝐵𝑇 = 545%. The variations of the growth rates are large, because the 
optimal Kelly bet is highly sensitive to large tail wins and losses as well as to numerical effects 
when the parameters of original losses/wins and tail losses/wins are comparable.  
Kelly system provided key guidelines (M. J. Mauboussin 2006) for the practitioners in spite of 
some objections from the mainstream economists. The mainstream economics focused on 
developing probabilistic ensemble-average utility theory. Recent breakthrough understanding 
(Peters 2011) of the differences between ensemble-average and time-average formulations 
presents Kelly criterion in a new light and proposes the dynamic approach to the gamble 
problem. The non-ergodic multiplicative processes can simulate the market dynamics and the 
fat-tailed distributions, and the time-average formulation might provide better insights into the 
dynamic leverage strategies beyond the optimization calculus of Kelly criterion23.  
Kelly Parity 
In this section, I discuss how Kelly criterion applies to the multi-asset portfolio in the world 
with or without fat tails. Important relations and differences between different portfolio 
approaches of Mean-Variance (MV) optimization, based on classical MPT, Risk Parity (RP) 
and Kelly Parity (KP) (to be defined below) emerge. Risk Parity is a risk-adjusted portfolio 
management approach, which goes beyond the leverage aversion of conventional MPT 
(Assness 2012). The most naïve RP approach is to allocate each asset in the Risk Parity 
portfolio according to the risk-adjusted weight  1 𝜎𝑖⁄ , inversely proportionally to the asset’s 
volatility 𝜎𝑖. A portfolio approach, which uses Kelly criterion for its construction, can be called 
Kelly Parity. At the level of the definitions, Risk Parity pares assets based on their risks (usually 
understood as the volatilities), while Kelly Parity pares assets based on their growth rates. 
Kelly criterion in risky world gives the following allocation 𝑓𝑖 for the asset i of the N-asset 
portfolio (Thorp 2006) 
𝑓𝑖 =  ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
−1𝑀𝑗 ,
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
                                                          
22 See pages 175-176 of (Brown 2012). I modified slightly the example, since the case of initial 20% probability 
edge combined with one-sided possibility of 5-fold gains leads to the growth divergence.  
23 In our analysis of Kelly criterion throughout the technical part of the paper, we assume that the risk 
premium and the fat tails are unrelated, in the future research it will be interesting to examine the risk 
premium being due to the fat tails in the context of the recent empirical finding (Lemperiere 2015) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗
−1 is the inverse matrix of the covariance matrix 𝐶𝑖𝑗 =  𝜌𝑖,𝑗𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗 , and 𝑀𝑗  is the risk 
premium vector. Kelly Parity prescribes allocations for all assets with the total portfolio 
leverage 𝑍 =  1̅ ∗ 𝐶−1 ∗ 𝑀. In practice, there are constraints on specific and total leverage24, 
and therefore a finite selection of the assets has to be made. 
In the framework of MPT and MV optimization, the maximization of Sharpe Ratio =
𝑓𝑇𝑀 (𝑓𝑇 ∗ 𝐶 ∗ 𝑓)
1
2⁄⁄  , subject to the constraint𝑓𝑇 ∗ 1̅ = 1, has to be done. Remarkably, the 
solution (for instance, see (Chan 2008)) is equivalent to the Kelly solution with the absolute 
leverage equal to one.  This simple, not widely known, result is worth noting. Namely, Kelly 
Parity prescribes not only the optimal absolute portfolio leverage but also relative leverages 
of the assets identically to the mean-variance optimization (Markowitz 1959). Kelly Parity25 
not only maximizes the long-term growth but also minimizes the variance for a given return 
(by the virtue of the Sharpe ratio minimization). 
Risk Parity and Mean Variance portfolio approaches are generally viewed to be different by 
the construction. Risk Parity optimizes the variance without any reference to the expected risk 
premiums, which are generally less predictable than the average volatilities, while Mean 
Variance optimizes the Sharpe ratio in the space of the expected returns and the variances. It 
appears that RP has “extreme parameter ignorance” in the sense of ignoring the input of the 
expected returns26. Kelly Parity suggests a new perspective and a deeper connection between 
RP and MV. Without going into the dependencies on correlations27, and, for the simplicity in 
the limit of zero correlations, Kelly Parity is equivalent to Risk Parity if all assets have the 
same Sharpe ratios. Kelly allocation 𝑓𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 𝜎𝑖
2⁄  becomes equivalent to the simple 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑆𝑅 𝜎𝑖⁄ , 
where Sharpe ratio factor is the same for all assets 𝑆𝑅 = 𝜇𝑖 𝜎𝑖⁄ . Sharpe ratio factor is the overall 
leverage scaling remaining in RP approach to target particular return level. In fact, it can be 
argued that RP makes implicit assumption of assets having equal Sharpe ratios in the efficient 
markets, since from the beginning the focus of RP is on the balancing the assets by their 
corresponding risks28.  
Risk Parity encompasses a whole family of the strategies and implementations by building on 
the sound idea of risk-adjusted allocation. Tail Risk Parity (Alankar 2012) is a radical 
rethinking of RP, when the risk is defined as Expected Tail Loss, similar to the tail loss  𝐸𝑇𝐿   
discussed above. TRP aims to control the tail risks without over-constraining the local variance 
risks. In contrast, Mean-Variance optimization minimizes variance for a given level of return29, 
but the minimization of the variance leads to increasing the large risks (fattening the tails) 
(Sornette, Andersen and Simonetti 2000). Kelly growth calculations are insightful and practical 
because the risk premium and tail risks can be treated in a balanced way. 
                                                          
24 Specific expressions for the one and two assets cases are given here. In the case of one asset, 𝑍 =  
𝜇
𝜎2⁄  is 
exactly Kelly leverage. In the case of the two assets, for instance, the first asset has absolute leverage  𝑍1 =
 (𝜇1 𝜎1
2⁄ − 𝜌 𝜇2 (𝜎1𝜎2)⁄ ) (1 − 𝜌
2)⁄ , relative leverage is 𝑍1 𝑍⁄ , where the total leverage is 𝑍 =
 (𝜇1 𝜎1
2⁄ + 𝜇2 𝜎2
2⁄ − 𝜌(𝜇1 + 𝜇2) (𝜎1𝜎2)⁄ ) (1 − 𝜌
2)⁄ . 
25 in risky world but not necessarily in risky and uncertain world 
26 In other words, RP is agnostic about the expected returns. 
27 This technical point can be investigated separately in the future. 
28 We will not delve here into the practical application of Kelly Parity and Risk Parity based on the assets or 
factors (Bhansali V. 2012) and practical successes of RP due to secular trends and structural reasons. 
29 In some constructions, Risk Parity determines the relative allocation of the assets in the portfolio by 
leveraging them to the same return. 
The close connections between all three different portfolio approaches (MV, RP and KP) show 
that Kelly Parity is on the solid ground for the portfolio construction ‘in the risky world’. More 
challenging to investigate next is how Kelly Parity can be extended for skewed and convex 
assets. In what follows, we generalize how individual skews and convexities of each asset add 
up or balance each other in Kelly Parity of multi-asset portfolio in risky and uncertain world.  
Our next task is to elucidate qualitative aspects of the skew and convexity effects at the simple 
conceptual level of Risk Parity and Kelly Parity portfolio approaches30, while the technical 
mathematical analysis for the multi-asset portfolio with power-law tailed assets have been 
attempted before (for instance, (Bouchard, et al. 1998)). In the simplest case if assets are 
uncorrelated, the rescaling of the leverage is independent. Nevertheless some assets, previously 
selected to the most optimal portfolio, can become less attractive and upended by other assets 
due to the different suppression of the growth rates by downside fat tails. More generally, we 
can consider two correlated or anti-correlated assets. The two assets can have the skews co-
aligned or anti-aligned with the assets correlation. For instance, skew co-alignment means that 
the implied and realized volatilities increase for both assets in their typical correlated move. In 
terms of the toy model explored in this paper, skew co-alignment means that both assets are 
correlated not only occurring in their normal volatility states simultaneously but also in their 
corresponding tail loss states. The full technical details will need to be presented in a separate 
future paper, and the portfolio solutions can depend in complex ways on parameters. Analytical 
results can be viewed as tail loss perturbation corrections to Kelly Parity portfolios in terms of 
small parameters 
𝛼 𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇
,  
𝛼 𝐸𝑇𝐿2
𝜎2
 and   
𝜇 𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜎2
. Numerical results can also be calculated for the 
realistic probability density functions. In simple cases, natural results can be expected with 
further suppression of the growth rate in the case correlated co-aligned skews; for instance, the 
factor 𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿1  is replaced by  𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿1(1 + 𝜇2𝐸𝑇𝐿2 𝜎2
2).⁄  More interesting case is anti-
correlated assets with skew alignment, in this case the absolute leverage and growth rate may 
not be suppressed noticeably. How a multi-asset portfolio can be optimised relative to (several) 
possible extreme scenarios is a separate interesting problem, which is similar to Tail Risk Parity 
(Alankar 2012). Multi-asset portfolio choice and optimization can aim to balance 
simultaneously the diversification in the few scenarios of the tail events and the amplification 
of the growth rate at the normal volatility core.  
Adaptive management of risk, uncertainty and leverage 
Active Risk Management (RM) can embrace the complex interplay between risk, uncertainty, 
and leverage guided by the quantitative principles. Human decision making with its 
behavioural aspects need to be brought together with the quantitative insights in the overall 
RM framework. After all, human decisions and adaptability remain central to the financial 
markets and portfolio management, at least at the current, still quite basic, stage of the artificial 
intelligence and the quantitative understanding of the complex systems, markets and 
economics. 
Fear, greed and some rationality drive the financial markets and the financial decision-making. 
In the prospect theory, (Kahneman 1979) underlined the choice value “… assigned to gains 
and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision 
                                                          
30 Another interesting direction of the research is how the trend strategy can be combined with Risk Parity and 
Kelly Parity and hedge their skews and convexity.  The trend strategy is positive convexity (Bouchard, et al. 
2016) and positive skew, while Kelly Parity and Risk Parity in their simplest forms are naturally negative skew 
and positive convexity. 
weights.” The certainty is preferred to the uncertainty; moreover, the individuals tend to be risk 
averse in the face of gains and risk seeking in the face of losses. The uncertainty of fear 
dominates the uncertainty of greed; this asymmetry sustains a negative skew of equity markets. 
All markets have symmetric or asymmetric fat tails expressed in the volatility skew and 
convexity. Furthermore, Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961) illustrates how the uncertainty and 
the complexity reduce the risk appetite. The financial decision-making has to recognise how 
the behavioural views on the uncertainty feeds into the quantitative choice of leverage. 
The drawdown aversion can express the fear of the permanent loss. The drawdown, defined as 
a certain percentage loss of the capital, is a natural and important risk measure from the 
prospect theory perspective, and the associated aversion to the drawdown has to be managed 
accordingly with behavioural individual preferences. The conventional MPT and CAPM, 
dealing with the final assets, as per above quote, can only consider the drawdown aversion as 
an afterthought (see the Appendix B). How the drawdown aversion, expressed through the 
uncertainty of the tail loss, changes the single-asset allocation (Kelly leverage) and the multi-
asset portfolio theory, is one of the central topics of this paper. The drawdown aversion is 
rational, quantified by fractional Kelly criterion for fat-tailed assets, and behavioural, and both 
aspects are self-reinforcing. 
In the absence of the tail risks, the leverage has to be scaled inversely with the variance (if the 
risk premium remains fixed) during stable periods of the variance. Kelly system underlined 
practical risk-management systems of several, if not many, successful practitioners. “The 
natural risk” is the variance (Arnott 2005) (Kelly 1956), not the volatility. Kelly fraction is an 
important dimensionless risk measure, which is different from the Sharpe ratio. “Thus the Kelly 
investor will dynamically reallocate as optimal 𝑓∗ changes over time because of fluctuations 
in the forecast…” (Thorp 2006)  of the excess return and the volatility31. Even in the risky 
world, the challenges are many from quantitative to behavioural. Among quantitative ones are 
the evaluation of the risky parameters and the edge of the Kelly system showing up only slowly 
in the number of the financial bets in the crossover from the most probable to the “true average” 
(Redner 1990). The numerous behavioural ones (Peterson 2007) are the rational view on the 
possible long drawdowns, not “taking profits too soon”, and other “path dependencies”. In the 
world with the uncertainty tails, Kelly criterion is one of the guidelines for making decisions. 
The range of the decisions can be narrowed, but not to an obviously optimal choice, since the 
uncertainty is much less certain than the risk32. This is always the case in the real world as 
Kelly criterion can rarely be used literally.  
Risk taking and risk management are the art and the skills of making good and certain decisions 
under uncertainty. The perceived uncertainty33 and the chosen leverage are the parts of the 
various positive and negative feedback loops, which enforce the adaptation of the collective 
markets and the individual investors to new information and new strategies. The interaction of 
adaptive investor and adaptive markets34 is the dynamic capital allocation game. 
The risk management regimes can be classified into the three regions by the magnitude of the 
market downside fluctuations, i. e. relative losses (consistently with the prospect theory).  The 
normal volatility region (“white swans”) is around the centre of pdf within -10%. The 
                                                          
31 The fluctuations of the volatility (volatility of volatility) and the fluctuations of the tail parameters (tail 
probability and tail loss) can produce so-called convexity adjustments.  
32 However obvious or tautological this statement is. 
33 The evaluation of the uncertainty and the risks is one of the main behavioural and rational tasks. 
34 The important problem is how single-agent strategy is consistent with the multi-agent system representing 
the markets. A consistency of multi-agent beliefs and risk views with their interactions is far beyond this paper.  
transitional area between -10% and -25% can be called “grey swans”, the precursors to “black 
swans”. Lastly, the “black swans” (Taleb 2008) region of the tail beyond -25% moves. Each 
region requires different operational modes of the decisions and actions (Bhansali 2014) in 
terms of active portfolio management. Diversification and dynamic rebalancing are appropriate 
risk-management approaches in the normal volatility region. The transitional region is of the 
pivotal importance35, connecting the normal region with the fully unpredictable region of 
“black swans”, and this is where the uncertainties and risks are most finely balanced. The 
experience, the transitional hedging strategies (the options and momentum strategies are 
particularly pertinent), and the adaptive rational decisions can make huge difference. “Grey 
swans” is the key region, where the risk manager’s behaviour, the risk judgement and the 
quantitative framework become complementary. Since the “black swan” region is extremely 
rare and defined as completely unpredictable, then the best way to think about “black swans” 
is to take considerate care of “grey swans”.  
Risk-management system is a behavioural and quantitative framework, which embodies “a 
talent of managing events as they arise”. The risk-management system has to protect the 
competitive edge36 from deep or unrecoverable setbacks. One of the main consequences of the 
uncertainty, made clear by Kelly calculations, is very familiar; do not underestimate the 
uncertainty, do not overleverage. The hedging of tail risk (Bhansali 2014) is a necessity not a 
luxury. Even diversified portfolio has some systemic and concentration risks from the threat of 
some particular events. Different assets and hedges have not only different instrinsic (relative 
to capital structure, i.e. equity or debt) but also payoff and instrument based (options, CDS, 
etc.) convexity and skew, and these non-linear effects are critical in the management of grey 
swans. The portfolio of different financial assets (equity, debt, etc.) and instruments (OTC 
derivatives, futures, ETFs, etc.) have to be scrutinized for sufficient market and funding 
liqudity when liquidity can be hard to obtain. The uncertainty of dangers and opportunities 
(Brown 2012) requires proxy hedging and imaginative approaches. Tail hedging is an asset-
allocation decision, and different mentality, organisational setup and behavioural biases of 
managing the core portfolio versus the tail risk hedging can benefit the overall portfolio.  
“Edge is the key” is the main principle of risk taking.  In the world of the quantifiable risk, 
Kelly criterion builds on the amplification of the risk premium (edge) through the leverage. 
Maximizing the long-term multi-period37  growth rate and minimizing the ruin chances is 
exactly how Kelly criterion strikes the fine balance and makes the edge effective. In the great 
debate about the advantages and disadvantages of the active and passive management, the 
skilful management of leverage and uncertainty is where the active management can lead by 
exploiting the leverage and the professional judgement about uncertainty.  
Due to the intermittent nature of the markets, successful management of leverage and 
uncertainty have to be path-dependent and adaptive. The origin of risk premiums is critical for 
the appropriate investor strategy, although the risk premium (the edge) is assumed a priori in 
the Kelly calculations. Different cases of risk premiums and uncertainty require specialised 
                                                          
35 In the note of caution from the famous investor, Peter Lynch: “Far more money has been lost by investors 
preparing for corrections, or trying to anticipate corrections, than has been lost in corrections themselves”. 
36 In the Kelly calculations in this paper, the edge is assumed to be around the centre of pdf, which is a good 
description only for certain businesses (credit institutions, high-yield funds, etc.). 
37 In practice, for many different reasons, multiple-periods reinvestment with stable quantifiable edge is rarely 
possible. The volatility (noise), the uncertainty and the competitive deterioration of any edge are very 
powerful drivers of the markets, which make the sustainability of the edge very difficult and very rare. 
firms and different adaptive strategies38. The basic balance of greed and fear can be seen 
already from simple expressions of the toy model for the arithmetic growth factor 𝑟 =
(1 − 𝛼)𝜇 − 𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿  in the presence of however small probability  𝛼  of a tail loss. Although 
the greed of the risk premium (1 − 𝛼)𝜇  can exceed the expected losses of the fear 𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿, a 
onetime loss  𝐸𝑇𝐿 can be significant. The investors attempt to outsmart each other by banking 
on greed gains and trying to avoid the fear losses. Important sequence of the good outcomes in 
the finite sample (relative to market odds in the probabilistic sense) by luck and skill is not 
underestimated by many investors in comparison with the statistical long-run edge, and this 
observation creates important dynamics of the markets. The markets do permit relatively stable 
risk premiums and volatility regimes over some time periods, which can be exploited by 
statistical Thorp-Kelly systems, but regime changes have to be recognized by the outside 
adaptable decision maker. 
Taking advantage of the diversity breakdowns (M. Mauboussin 2007) (regime changes) and 
benefiting from the expected value mindset (M. Mauboussin 2004) take us into the heart of the 
realistic and successful management of grey swans. “Dramatic diversity breakdown” and “time 
arbitrage breakdown” are important market heuristics of the regime changes, which are 
characteristic of the complex adaptive systems. Diversity breakdowns become triggered as 
more and more investors recognize particular patterns (viewed as trends or risk premiums), 
initiated at different times and managed to different time horizons, and deploy higher leverage 
under collectively perceived and diminishing uncertainty. Subjective views become less 
diverse resulting in the diversity breakdowns. Risk premium strategies, which can be levered 
according to Kelly criterion, appear to compete with the diversity breakdowns, which spark 
sharp or even violent trends. In any case, open competition of the investors‘ strategies in the 
allocation of capital makes good markets. Another aspect is that liquidity has to be 
commensurate with the leverage and the investor strategy. Liquidity is a very important part of 
the feedback loops, where the investor provides and depends on the liquidity from the complex 
markets. In practice, risk taking not only can be empowered by the statistical quantitative 
methods (like Kelly criterion) but also has to evolve by adapting to the regime changes and the 
diversity and liquidity breakdowns. 
Uncertainty and leverage are the key risk preferences. Prices (information and patterns), 
preferences (aversions, uncertainty, and leverage), and probabilities (risk) have been 
highlighted to encompass consistent risk management (Lo 1999). Risk taking and management 
are about consilience of qualitative, quantitative, technical and behavioural skills, which come 
together, in particular, in the judgement about the uncertainty and choosing the leverage 
accordingly. Risk management and risk taking are dual. The same events, the same grey swans, 
bring dangers and opportunities associated with uncertainty.   Interestingly, on general grounds, 
in the entrepreneurial context (Knight 1964) thought that the uncertainty deserves much higher 
returns than the risk. Consistent and skilful management of the uncertainty and the leverage 
can be the source of structural edge, especially since the market risk premiums can be largely 
due to the uncertainty (Lemperiere 2015).  
                                                          
38 Realistic markets also exhibit various memory and correlation effects in the risk and uncertainty pricing, and 
there is good value for risk takers in recognizing even the short-range correlations in multiplicative processes 
(see nice mathematical illustrations in (Redner 1990)). The pattern recognition is one of the salient properties 
of good risk takers; see for example, a classic book (Lefevre 2005). 
Conclusion 
The leverage and the uncertainty have to be managed consistently in a proper, even though 
subjective, risk-management framework, and several practical results and guidelines have been 
discussed here. In particular, the uncertainty determines how fractional Kelly criterion can be 
used more effectively in practice. The fractional weight can be estimated, not exactly 
calculated, from the subjective probability weights and the severity of the uncertainty tails. 
Uncertainty, due to many uncontrollable and unpredictable events, constraints leverage beyond 
risk. 
Kelly Parity, multi-asset portfolio based on Kelly criterion of optimisation of geometric growth 
rates, encompasses major, widely known, portfolio approaches of Risk Parity and Mean-
Variance optimization. In particular, Kelly Parity becomes Mean-Variance Optimization if the 
absolute leverage is constrained to unity. Kelly Parity becomes basic Risk Parity if the Sharpe 
ratio of all involved assets is the same. Due to the volatility convexity and skew (parametrized 
by left and right tails), Kelly Parity has to adjust absolute and relative leverages. 
“The fundamental law of investing is the uncertainty of the future” (Bernstein 1992). The 
management of leverage and uncertainty is one of the most important strands in successful 
investing. The paper presents a certain perspective and a programme for the future empirical 
and theoretical research with many open questions. Human decision-making, adaptiveness, and 
the drawdown management are discussed phenomenologically from the practitioner’s 
perspective. Adaptive and skilful management of uncertainty and leverage can build a 
successful edge by taking on “grey swans” opportunities and managing possible drawdowns. 
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Appendix A.  Analytical calculation for the pdf with the tail loss 
probability. 
The original Kelly criterion can be reproduced by using a pdf as a sum of the two delta 
functions. The pdf is of the form 𝑃(𝑥) = 0.5 (𝛿(𝜇 + 𝜎) +  𝛿(𝜇 − 𝜎)), where the excess return 
𝜇 and the volatility 𝜎 are parameters. We assume the limit 𝜎 ≫  𝜇 for the consistency with 
Kelly calculations. The geometric growth rate (Thorp 2006) as a function of constant fraction 
of the invested capital    𝑓 is 
𝑔0(𝑓) = 0.5 ln(1 + 𝑓(𝜇 + 𝜎)) +  0.5 ln(1 + 𝑓(𝜇 − 𝜎)).  
The maximization solution gives 𝑓0
∗ =
𝜇
𝜎2−𝜇2
≈
𝜇
𝜎2
  and gives 𝑔0(𝑓0
∗) ≈ 0.5
𝜇2
𝜎2
  consistently 
with the Thorp’s results. 
A physical interpretation of Kelly leverage is the ratio of the diffusion time 1 𝜎2⁄  divided by the 
drift time 1 𝜇⁄ .  In this interpretation, small allocation 𝑓
∗  ≪ 1 means that the drift time 1 𝜇⁄  is 
longer than the diffusion time 1 𝜎2⁄ , and the “return edge” is small (the geometric growth 
𝑔(𝑓∗) is smaller than the return 𝜇). High allocation 𝑓∗  ≫ 1 means that the growth is fast 
enough, not eroded too quickly by the noise, in this case the drift time is shorter than the 
diffusion time. 
We would like to analyze the results in the case of possible, but rare, large tail losses. The pdf 
can be defined as 𝑃(𝑦) = 𝛼 𝛿(𝑦 + 𝐸𝑇𝐿) +
1−𝛼
2
[δ(y − (μ + σ)) + δ(y − (μ − σ))], where the 
additional parameters are the probability of the tail loss 𝛼 and the size of the tail loss 𝐸𝑇𝐿  
(Expected Tail Loss). For the same “positive edge”, the condition 𝜇 >  𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿 is required. The 
relation 
𝜇0
𝜎0
2 <  
1
𝐸𝑇𝐿
 is required for the growth rate  𝑔(𝑓) staying well defined at the tail loss state. 
The regime 
1
𝐸𝑇𝐿
<
1
𝜎
 implies the tail loss is noticeably larger than the volatility. 
The geometric growth function, to be maximized, is 
𝑔(𝑓) = 𝛼 ln(1 − 𝑓 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿) +
1−𝛼
2
[ln(1 + 𝑓(𝜇 + 𝜎)) + ln(1 + 𝑓(𝜇 − 𝜎))]. 
The relevant solution39 continuously connected with the original 𝑓∗ is40 
𝑓1
∗ ≈
𝜇 − 𝛼(𝜇 + 𝐸𝑇𝐿)
𝜎2 − 𝜇2 + 𝛼(2𝜇𝐸𝑇𝐿 − (𝜎2 − 𝜇2))
≈
𝜇
𝜎2
(1 −
𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇(1 − 𝛼)
)
(1 +
𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿2
𝜎2(1 − 𝛼)
)
 
 𝑓1
∗ is dependent on the tail loss  𝐸𝑇𝐿 in the two combinations  
𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇(1−𝛼)
  and 
𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿2
𝜎2(1−𝛼)
. Clearly, 𝑓1
∗ <
 𝑓∗ is reduced by numerical factor , and the growth rate is smaller as well 
𝑔(𝑓1
∗) ≈
𝜇2
2𝜎2
(1 − 𝛼)
(1 −
𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇(1 − 𝛼)
)
2
(1 +
𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿2
𝜎2(1 − 𝛼)
)
 
                                                          
39 The model considered here is a static model based on the pdf. It would be interesting to generalize the 
model to the dynamic model and the limit of large N-steps (p.22 of (Thorp 2006)). The time scale related to the 
tail loss mixing and the scaling with N would be of interest. 
40 Perhaps, some of these results are due to the particular form of the logarithm dependence. Notice that the 
exponential growth function is naturally logarithmic. The growth function is conceptually different from the 
conventional utility function of the probabilistic utility theory.  
It is  interesting that the effect of the relative impact parameter (1 −
𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇(1−𝛼)
) on the growth rate 
𝑔(𝑓1
∗) is only quadratic. We can see clearly41 that the growth rate decreases sharply when 
2𝛼𝐸𝑇𝐿 becomes of the same order as the excess return 𝜇, this condition is more stringent by a 
factor of 2 than the threshold for the positivity of the arithmetic growth rate (also the first 
moment)  −𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇 > 0. This result illustrates the robustness of the Kelly system 
to the perturbative tail effects, but the adjustment of the leverage is esssential nevertheless. A 
dynamical model would shed more light on the different timescales associated with the drift, 
diffusion, the tail loss and their mixing. 
The above analytical results were tested by the exact numerical solution of the lengthy 
quadratic equation for 𝑓1
∗ . The parameters of the return and the volatility can be recalibrated 
to the original parameters as follows. The mean and the variance are given by the expresions  
< 𝑦 > = −𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇 and  < 𝑦2 > = 𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝑇𝐿2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝜇2 + 𝜎2). If the original 
excess return 𝜇0 and the volatility 𝜎0  are substituted, then the calibrated values of 𝜇 and 𝜎 are 
𝜇 =
𝜇0
1−𝛼
+
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐸𝑇𝐿 and 𝜎2 =
𝜎0
2
1−𝛼
− 𝛼(𝐸𝑇𝐿 + 𝜇)2.  One observation, which emerges from the 
numerical parameter testing, is that the the growth rate can remain stable. At the same time, 
the leverage needs to be increased significantly when  𝐸𝑇𝐿  increases. A qualitative 
interpretation of this numerical finding is that the tail loss can remain hidden and unnoticed at 
the level of average growth. But many path-dependent properties do change due to the tail loss 
(for instance, the drawdown distribution), especially in the view of slow convergence of the 
multiplicative process. 
Another observation is that for sufficiently strong tail loss 𝐸𝑇𝐿 the solution 𝑓1
∗ switches from 
positive to negative smoothly. This means that for strongly skewed asset it is optimal to “short 
the asset”. This result is shown in the Figure below. 
 
                                                          
41 The full set of the conditions is (a)  ) 𝜎 ≫  𝜇 for the consistency of the low leverage approximation of the 
assumed pdf (b) 
𝜇0
𝜎0
2 <  
1
𝐸𝑇𝐿
 to preserve the original maximum of the growth function (c) 𝛼 ≪ 1   for the 
perturbative effect of the tail loss (d)  
𝐸𝑇𝐿
𝜇
> 1  for the meaningful parameter choice. 
The geometric growth and the leverage are shown as a function of  𝐸𝑇𝐿. The parameters are 
𝜇 = 0.4%, 𝜎 = 10%, 𝛼 = 2%. Simple Kelly leverage and growth rate are  𝑓0
∗ = 0.4 and 𝑔0
∗ =
0.08% . Notice that the arithmetic growth is negative 𝑟 = 𝜇 −
𝜎2
2
= −0.1%. For 𝐸𝑇𝐿 = 10% , 
the fractional leverage is 𝑓1
∗ = 0.2, and the fractional growth rate drops to 𝑔1
∗ = 0.02% . 
In a separate exercise, in a similar way how the volatility is described to be convex and skewed, 
we can ask what the skew and the convexity of the growth rate are. The leverage and the 
geometric growth decrease as the volatility increases, which mean that Kelly strategy has a 
negative skew as a function of the volatility. The second derivative 𝑑2𝑔∗/𝑑2𝜎 is positive, thus 
the Kelly strategy has a positive convexity as function of the volatility. The volatility of a stock 
(to be specific) has the skew and the convexity as a function of the stock price. Thus we can 
express the non-linear properties of the geometric growth rate as a function of the stock price42. 
Straightforwardly, the growth skew 𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑔 and the growth convexity 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔 are scaled 
by the same factor 𝑍𝑔 = − 𝑑𝑔
∗ 𝑑𝜎⁄ + 2 𝜎 𝑑2𝑔∗/𝑑2𝜎 from the corresponding volatility skew 
𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜎  and the volatility convexity𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝜎 . Since the scaling factor 𝑍𝑔 = 13𝜇/𝜎
3  for 
simple Kelly case is positive for the above form of 𝑔∗(𝜎), the growth rate has the same sign 
skew 𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑔 = 𝑍𝑔 ∙ 𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜎  (negative for equities) and the same sign convexity 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔 =
𝑍𝑔 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝜎  (positive for equities) as a function of the stock price. 
Appendix B. Concave Efficient Frontier 
The main quantitative thrust of the paper focuses on the optimization of the geometric growth 
rate by extending Kelly criterion in the presence of the fat tails for the single asset and multi-
asset portfolio. The larger qualitative problem, addressed in the paper, is the critical role of the 
leverage and the uncertainty in the trading and investment decisions, which are not addressed 
by the classical theories of mean-variance optimisation and CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing 
Model). Although the central role of the leverage and fat tails (the uncertainty) is a completely 
different starting point fundamentally and conceptually from those well-established theories, 
nevertheless it is instructional (and the topic of this appendix) to discuss some of the 
perturbative changes to the classical theories due to the the leverage and the uncertainty. These 
insights allow comparing and relating different theoretical vantage points. 
The investors are very concerned with possible large losses or drawdowns. Among various 
important risk preferences of the investors is the drawdown loss aversion, which can be defined 
as the degree of the drawdown (the loss of the capital) acceptable for the investor. In other 
words, let us imagine that the investor specifies the acceptable drawdown level (the loss cannot 
exceed this level) and accepts the consequences of the choice43. The drawdown history and 
analysis are already a noticeable practice in the financial industry. The drawdown aversion is 
one of the quantitative ways to quantify the loss aversion and estimate the subjective 
uncertainty. The perceived uncertainty and the loss aversion determine subjective investor’s 
drawdown level.  
To model the drawdown aversion, the investor has to buy the downside put option with the 
strike at the drawdown level. The cost of this option modifies the efficient frontier. The straight-
line efficient frontier becomes strongly concave frontier, which is due to the skew of the 
                                                          
42 A simple static, so called local, volatility skew and convexity are assumed. 
43 This risk preference will require the investor to understand the costs of the option protection. The investor 
will have to weigh the comfort of the drawdown protection and the reduced performance target (due to the 
cost of the protection). 
probability distribution (asymmetry between losses and gains) and due to convexity (heavy fat 
tails without asymmetry between tails). Naturally, the efficient frontier becomes lower. Even 
without the skew and smile effect on the volatility, the put option cost lowers the return. The 
skew and smile volatility effects make the tails of the pdf heavy (fat), which make in turn the 
put option cost more significant and decrease the expected return further.  
 
 
Fig 2. The efficient frontier shifts lower because of the drawdown protection cost (acceptable 
10% loss) without and with additional skew (risk reversal premium) affect.  
Another important point is that the efficient frontier is not unique anymore for all investors, 
because the level of drawdown aversion differentiates different investors in their expected 
returns (drawn as a function of the volatility, the conventionally defined risk). Although in 
practical MPT (modern portfolio theory) application, investors may differ in their projected 
expected returns and risks, the differentiation between investors due to their drawdown 
aversions may be expected to be even more significant44.  
In addition to the drawdown aversion, the mechanisms of the leverage financing also add to 
the concavity of the efficient frontier. Stronger concavity, for the part of the efficient frontier 
with the leverage above unity, can be related to the margin financing spread, paid by the 
leverage taker, and various so-called wrong way risks related to gap risks and outflows risks 
(for instance, (M. J. Mauboussin 2006)). The latter risks lead to reduced returns because the 
leverage unwinds happen “at the worst times” or “at the least favourable terms”. The concave 
shape and even downward sloping of the efficient frontier, due to stop-loss and overleveraging, 
were suggested before by (Illinski 2010). 
The importance of the drawdown aversion can be highlighted in another way. Different 
strategies and portfolios can aim to achieve high returns by taking significant downside risks. 
In order to put different funds (strategies) on the same footing and prevent over-leveraging of 
the downside risks, DrawDown Valuation Adjustment (DDVA), which quantifies the cost of 
                                                          
44 The heterogeneity of the investors is appropriate in the description of the markets. 
the drawdown protection for a given drawdown level, can be introduced. This type of the 
valuation adjustment is similar in spirit to the so called CVA (Credit Valuation Adjustment) 
from the derivatives industry (Gregory 2012). CVA expresses a valuation adjustment to MtM 
(Mark-to-Market) value of the derivatives due to the counterparty credit risk not mitigated by 
any collateral. CVA eliminated the arbitrage between the cash instruments (bonds, etc.) and 
the derivative instruments. Similarly, the Drawdown VA should eliminate the arbitrage 
between the funds taking excessive risks in the sense of possible significant loss and the funds 
taking more balanced risks. The conceptual difference between CVA and DDVA is that 
Drawdown VA is proposed to be calculated below a certain drawdown strike, corresponding 
to a certain level of loss. Thus a certain range of the volatility is not penalized. DDVA at 
“certain loss level” is consistent with the main risk being “a permanent loss”, where the investor 
cannot accept further losses beyond the drawdown level, while she accepts the volatility at the 
“normal course of events”. Such an adjustment would be challenging the financial industry to 
implement for many reasons, from technical to educational; nevertheless, this adjustment 
reflects a realistic value adjustment due to loss uncertainties. In the context of MPT, Markowitz 
stressed the applicability of the utility theory beyond Gaussian distributions, but he did not 
consider explicitly the drawdown aversion and multi-period growth rate calculated by the Kelly 
criterion. 
In summary, by introducing DDVA adjustment due to the drawdown aversion within the 
framework of MPT, we noticed that the risk premium on the efficient frontier (per unit of asset) 
depends not only on the volatility (as in CAPM) but also non-linearly on the drawdown 
aversion and the leverage. This conclusion highlights that there are non-linear feedback effects 
between the investor’s choices of the leverage, the views on the uncertainty and the expected 
returns. 
